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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.~lOSES

If. HARRIS,

Appeals No.
8065

Defendam.t and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS
We agree with appellant's staterrwnt of facts but desire to add one small note. The trial of this cause followed the procedure outlined and sanctioned by this court
in the case of State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d
383. Appellant was first convicted of the crime of driving
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor under an information containing two counts. The
first count charged him with the substantive offense and
the second with having been previously convicted of the
same offense. After a verdict of guilty was returned under the first count, the second portion of the information
was read and trial was had upon this issue. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of having been previously convicted of the same offense.
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STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
VERDICT THAT APPELLANT HAD BEEN CONVICTED OF.
THE PRIOR OFFENSE OF DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE ADMISSION OF A
CERTIFIED COPY OF THE MINUTE ENTRYS AND JUDGMENT OF AN ALLEGED PRIOR CONVICTION OF APPELLANT IN LOGAN CITY COURT.

POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT DIRECT A VERDICT IN ITS
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ISSUE OF PRIOR CONVICTION.
IF THE INSTRUCTION WAS ERRONEOUS; NEVERTHELESS APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED.

POINT IV.
IN THE EVENT THE JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE
JURY'S VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF A;
PRIOR CONVICTION IS REVERSED, A NEW TRIAL
SHOULD BE GRANTED ONLY AS TO THAT PART OF THE
CHARGE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
VERDICT THAT APPELLANT HAD BEEN CONVICTED OF
THE PRIOR OFFENSE OF DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR.

2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE ADMISSION OF A
CERTIFIED COPY OF THE MINUTE ENTRYS AND JUDGMENT OF AN ALLEGED PRIOR CONVICTION OF APPELLANT IN LOGAN CITY COURT.

Since Points I and II are intertwined and appellant
has considered the1n together in his brief, we shall do
the same. On the issue of identity appellant cites State v.
Bruno, 69 Utah -!:44, 256 P. 109, for the proposition that
identity is an element to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. He then cornplains of the absence of any evidence
showing the two defendants to be the smne and asserts
that this question should not have gone to the jury. We
have no quarrel with the reasonable doubt rule for it is
elementary. The rnatter of identity however is something
lying entirely within the province of the jury to decide
and thus it should be subn1itted to them. The Bruno
case cites State v. A.ime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704, for the
principle that the issue of identity should be submitted to
the jury. In both of those cases as in the one at bar there
was no evidence other than the record itself on the question of identity and the defendant in testifying did not
deny that he was the person formerly convicted. The
Aime conviction was affirmed on the grounds that the issue was put to the jury. r~rhe Bruno conviction was set
aside because the court perernptorily instructed the jury
that the records of the City Court were to be taken as
prima facie evidence of the fact that the defendant was
formerly convicted, thus charging them that as a matter
of law that fact was established.
')

,_)
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Therefore, the only question here to be resolYt>d is
whether the question of identity was properly put to the
jury. The charge is set out in appellant's brief on pp. 4-5
so we shall not set it out here. We call attention however
to the fact that the court specifically charges the jury
with the duty, on the evidence before them, of finding that
appellant was charged, entered a plea of guilty and sentence pronounced in order to find that he was previously
convicted. Counsel for appellant stated further that they
should find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was convicted in the City Court of the crime of drunken driving.
The court adopted this.
It is true that the City Court prosecution was against
a "l\Iose Harris". However, in the trial of the substantive offense it is to be noted that the appellant was repeatedly referred to as "Mose" by his own witnesses
(Tr. 57, 58, 60, 63, 70). It is apparent also that appellant
had lived in the valley for a number of years and was
well known, and further, that the conviction was had
in the precinct of appellant's residence. lie made no
proper objection to the reception of the certified copy,
offered no evidence, made no request for instruction or an
e"ception to a failure to instruct and made no argument
on this question, a matter clearly within his own knowledge. This case in this respect seems to fall within the
rule laid down by State v. A ime, supra, where it was
held:
But the verdict in this case does not rest upon
the bare proof of identity of name. There was
the additional circu1nstance that the previous conviction wa:s had in the precinct of defendant's resi4
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dence, and the more ~i5.~·nlficun t fad that, although
the defendant testified as a witness in his own behalf, he did not deny that he was the person described in the record of conviction previously
introduced in evidence against hirn. While under
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §9279, the neglect or refusal of a defendant to be a witness cannot prejudice hirn or be used against hirn, when he voluntarily testified he is subject to the same rules as
other witnesses, and his failure to deny a material
fact within his knowledge previously testified to
against hirn warrants the inference that it \vas
true. State v. Mattivi, 39 Utah, 334, 117 Pac. 31.
\Ve assert therefore that the question of identity was put
to the jury, that they could find frorn the evidence that
the appellant was formerly convicted and that their verdict of guilty properly assumes that they believed appellant to be the one previously convicted.
Appellant in support of his attack upon the lower
court's admission of a certified copy of minute entries
and judgrnent showing an alleged prior conviction in
Logan City Court, relies upon the case of State v. Florence, 79 Utah 200, 8 P. 2d 621. The Florence case perhaps
recited the rule insofar as mere docket entries were concerned in view of the applicable statute as it then existed. That statute was Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §8844,
and provided as follows:
In pleading a judgnwnt or other determination of, or proceeding before, a court or officer of
special jurisdiction, it shall not be necessary to
state the facts constituting jurisdiction; but the
judgrnent or deterrnination may be stated as give~
or made, or the proceedings had. rrhe facts consh5
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tuting jurisdiction, however, 1nust be established
on the trial.
This section carried over into R. S. U. 1933 verbatim, and
appeared as 105-21-17. However, in 1935 the legislature
completely re-wrote the Code of Criminal Procedure,
Laws of Utah 1935, Ch. 118, and this section, there denominated as 105-21-29, emerged as it now stands in 7721-29, U.C.A. 1953. It has a new and different meaning
now, however. It provides as follows:
(1) In referring in an information or indictment to a judgment or other determination of, or
a proceeding before, any court or official, civil or
military, it is unnecessary to allege the facts conferring jurisdiction on such court or official, hut
it is sufficient to allege generally that such judgInent or determination was given or made or such
proceeding had, in such manner as identifies the
judg1nent, determination or proceeding.
(2) If the judgment was given by an officer
exercising special jurisdiction or by a court other
than a court of record the facts constituting jurisdiction must be established on the trial.
Thus the legislature has since seen fit to impose the rule
laid down in the F'lorence case only on judgments given
by officers exercising special jurisdiction or courts other
than courts of record. There is now no such requirement
where courts of record are concerned. That city courts
are courts of record is set out in 78-1-1 and 78-1-2, U.C.A.
1953, which provide as follows:
78-1-l. The following- are the courts of justice
of this state :
(1) 'l1 he senate sitting as court of impeach-

n1ent.
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(:2) rl'he Supreme Court.

( 3) The district courts.
(·l) rrhe city rourts.
( 5) The juvenile courts.
(6) Justices' courts.

'

-~-..:..

............. ..a.--

78-1-2. r.rhe courts enu1nerated in the first;~
subdivisions of the preceding section are courts
of record.

Clearly then, the case of State v. Florence is not in point
and the certified copy was properly received in evidence.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT DIRECT A VERDICT IN ITS
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ISSUE OF PRIOR CONVICTION.
IF THE INSTRUCTION WAS ERRONEOUS; NEVERTHELESS APPELLANT \VAS NOT PREJUDICED.

Appellant relies on the holding in State v. Bruno,
supra, as authority for striking down the instruction
here given, asserting that it directs a verdict. The
instruction in that case was as follows:
In this case the records of the city court of
Salt Lake City, Utah, before Noel S. Pratt, city
judge, and ex officio justice of the peace, have
been received in evidence; that said records show
that on or about the 3rd day of September, 1924,
the defendant was found guilty of having intoxicating liquor in her possession, so that you are to
take that as prima facie evidence of the fact in
the case.
There is a material difference between that instruction
and the one given here. As recited before, the Bruno

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

instruction peremptorily instructed the jury that the
records of the City Court were to be taken by them as
prima facie evidence of the fact of conviction. In the
instant case the court's pronounce1nenta were permissive
in nature, still leaving the detern1ination of the fact to
the jury. While the charge might properly have been
framed in a different manner, it can be struck down onlv
on a showing that a substantial right of the defendant
has been affected. There is in fact a presumption that
error shall not be deemed to have resulted in prejudice.
This is contained in 77-32-1, U.C.A. 1953, as follows:
Alter hearing an appeal the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties. If error has been cominitted, it shall not
be presuined to have resulted in prejudice. rrhe
court Inust be satisfied that it has that effeet
before it is warranted in reversing the judgment.
The case of State v. Cluff, 48 Utah 102, 158 P. 701, contains an extensive discussion of error resulting in prejudice. There the trial court's ruling indulging improper
cross e~amina tion was complained of. This court through
Straup C. J., held that son1e con1mitted errors, prima
facie, are not calculated to do harm, and hence no
presumption of harn1ful effect is to be indulged, but
that the party affected may, by the record, show that
the ruling resulted in prejudice of s01ne substantial right.
On the other hand, error may be conunitted which, prima
facie, is calculated to prejudice some substantial right.
Prejudice will then be presun1ed until, by the record, it
IS shown that it did not or could not have prejudiced a
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substantial right. The court there affirmed the conviction on the ground that though prejudice should be
presumed from the error there con1mitted; nevertheless,
the record disclosed no violation of a substantial right
in the face of the undisputed evidence of guilt. The
court said:
Upon this evidence we do not say that the
defendant is guilty, or that he ought to have been
convicted. It is not within our province to decide
that or to detennine his guilt or innocence. But
because of the undisputed evidence, and the undenied admissions of the defendant, we are satisfied that the same result would have been reached
by the jury had not the i1nproper cross-examination and argu1nent been per1nitted, and hence that
the verdict was not influenced thereby. It may
be asked, How do we know that 1 We know it
hy attributing to the ;jury the common sense and
experience possessed by the a'-.rerage juror who,
mindful of his duty as a juror and considering the
evidence dispassionately, could not well have
rendered a verdict of not guilty without disregarding the undisputed evidence and undenied
admissions of the defendant as to his guilt.
\Ve sub1nit that in the instant case, confronted only by
the record of conviction, the jury could not well have
rendered a verdict of not guilty without disregarding
the undisputed evidence before them. Thus the same
result would have been reached in the absence of the
statement by the court, and hence the verdict was not
influenced thereby.
It is law too elemental for citation of authority that
instructions are to be considered as a whole and 1nay
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not be picked apart anJ portions of .then1 assigned as
error. If the charge overall is fair, it rnust stand. The
instruction in the instant case as a whole was fair and
left it to the jury to determine guilt or innocence.
POINT IV.
IN THE EVENT THE JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE
JURY'S VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF A
PRIOR CONVICTION IS REVERSED, A NEW TRIAL
SHOULD BE GRANTED ONLY AS TO THAT PART OF THE
CHARGE.

In the event the judgn1ent based upon the prior conviction is reversed, the whole matter should not be sent
back for a new trial. Appellant would be entitled to a
new trial only . on the issue of having been previously
convicted. The substantive conviction should stand. rrhis
must be so frorn the very nature of the proceeding. In
such a case as this a defendant is tried first on the substantive offense. No issue of prior conviction is injected
into this trial. It is not an element of the substantive
offense. Until a verdict is rendered on the principal
issue, there is no occasion to mention the prior conviction
because the previous offense would not be competent to
prove the defendant cornn1itted the offense for which he
is then on trial. Thus it differs fron1 the case of a persistent violator charge \vhere the previous conviction is
an elernent. State v. Stewart, supra. If a verdict of
guilty is returned, the second count in the information is
then read and the trial proceeds solely on the issue of a
prior conviction in front of the san1e jury. Therefore,
any error cornmitted in the trial of this second issue
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would not relate at all to the conviction on the substantive offense.
CONCLUSION
We sub1nit that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of prior conviction; that the court did
not err in ad1nitting the certified copy of the City Court
records and that the court did not direct a verdict in its
instructions on the issue of prior conviction, and
further that if the instruction was erroneous, nevertheless appellant was not prejudiced.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
RICHARD L. STINE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

